



















































Un chef est un marchand d’espérance.
(A leader is a dealer in hope.)
– Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821)
“For empirical work in social science to carry weight, the research must be able to show
that the researcher knows the concepts the actors are using. [:::] Do the subjects have the
same understanding of consequences of their actions as the researchers do? Do the subjects
have the same understanding of the causes of those consequences as the researchers do? In
short: is the subject understanding the situation in the way the researcher presupposes the
subject is understanding the situation?” (Mathew D. McCubbins and Mark Turner, 2012,
p. 397)
1 Introduction
The paper by Katz and McCubbins (2018) focuses on the analysis of correlations
between a well-defined variable of interest and a large set of covariates. It offers a
carefully crafted and accurate statistical description of the phenomena of interest.
Technically, the paper is at the state of the art, and yet I felt disappointed, for the
paper gives me no real understanding of why things happen the way they do; the
paper offers no causal explanations for the processes that drive individual action or
trigger collective phase transitions.
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Am I justified in my disappointment? Not according to Karl Pearson (1857–
1936), the founder of modern statistical science. According to him, science should
not explain anything. Its role is and must be restricted to accurate description and
prediction, and that is all that science can ever hope to do. For further details on
Pearson’s epistemology, see Stern (2017c). Surprisingly, though, I can find encour-
agement in my hope for understanding in no other than Professor McCubbins him-
self, who in 2012 wrote with Mark Turner a paper with the very suggestive title –
Going Cognitive: Tools for Rebuilding the Social Sciences, where the authors state
one of our opening quotations.
In asking for understanding I am not alone. In fact, I stand on the shoulders of gi-
ants, like Max Weber (1864–1920). According to Weber, collective behaviors and
social processes should be explained by the actions, attitudes, and beliefs of partic-
ipating individuals, and those, in turn, should be understood (verstanden) by their
meaning, as perceived and attributed by the same individuals (see Boudon, 2001,
p. 54). In this critique, I will make some further comments on the need for under-
standing, focusing on how and why I think it is relevant in the fields of empirical
studies in law and other human sciences.
Before ending this introductory section, I need to distance myself from the po-
sition of methodological incompatibility of Verstehen and Erklären. This position
states that methods used for Verstehen (i.e., interpretative understanding, which is
often specific, flexible, analogical, and qualitative) and methods used for Erklären
(i.e., law-governed explanation, which is often general, rigorous, computational,
and quantitative) are, by their very nature, intrinsically incompatible (see Bransen,
2001). In several already published and forthcoming articles, I have argued against
such methodological incompatibility (see Stern, 2015, 2017b). On the contrary,
I hold the position that Verstehen and Erklären are complementary and mutually
supportive approaches to science and synergic ways of comprehension.
Section 2 exemplifies the aforementioned position of synergic complementarity
of Verstehen and Erklären in an applied consulting project. Section 3 presents some
arguments to expand this position to the general scope of empirical legal studies,
based on the theoretical framework of Niklas Luhmann’s Sociological Theory of
Law. Section 4 returns to Katz and McCubbins’s (2018) paper, and presents our
final remarks.
2 Getting REAL in the Brazilian Stock Exchange
In the early ’90s I was involved in a consulting project aiming to detect opportuni-
ties for profitable trading on BOVESPA – the São Paulo Stock Exchange. At that
time, orders were still executed by open outcry on the trading floor, delays were
measured in minutes, not milliseconds, and operations could still be inspected and
supervised in real time by human beings. The software system developed in this
project had the task of automatically constructing, selecting, and suggesting intra-
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The first version of this software was based on hybrid polynomial networks (see
Lauretto et al., 2009, for a similar model). This system was able to suggest specific
operation strategies defined by an asset to be bought or sold at its current mar-
ket price, plus boundary conditions for closing an intraday operation defined by
(a) lower and upper limits on the asset’s price, and (b) the strategy expiration limit
defined by the trading day’s closing time plus auxiliary liquidity conditions. This
first version of the software also presented condensed statistical analyses based on
the suggested strategies’ past performance under similar market conditions.
The system was programmed to only suggest operation strategies with expected
performance exceeding the trading desk’s historical benchmarks. However, to our
astonishment, the supervising human traders were very hesitant in accepting the
suggested operations, even if they had excellent statistical prospects. When asked
the reason for their hesitation, the traders complained that the software did not help
them to understand why a given operation strategy should work, that is, the system
was unable to provide any insight or intuition about the process at hand. Without
such an understanding, the traders declared they did not have the necessary convic-
tion to take the implied risk; they lacked enough confidence to act. The software
team was astonished and disappointed, for the initial system specifications never
included giving (causal) explanations for why a given operation should work the
way it does. Moreover, the technological tools and statistical methods used to de-
velop this system were chosen for maximum predictive power, not contemplating
the purpose of generating causal (i.e., answering a “why” question) explanations.
Nevertheless, since a (well-paying) customer is always right, we decided to
reengineer the project, restarting from scratch if necessary. The first step in this
reengineering process was to research what constituted a good explanation in the
case at hand. After some interviews, it became clear that these traders were very
familiar with the so-called “technical indicators” (see Colby and Mayers, 1988).
Moreover, a short explanation based on having some significant key indicators with
values in meaningful ranges was the traders’ preferred way of accessing the mar-
ket behavior. Hence, we opted to implement the second version of this decision
support system based on REAL – an algorithm for constructing classification trees
(see Stern et al., 1998, Breiman et al., 1984, and Unger and Wysotzki, 1981). In
the new system, the pertinent branch of the classification tree built by REAL could
be used to offer a good (that is, interpretable and intuitive) explanation for the sug-
gested strategy, encouraging the traders to take the required action, and making the
project a success for all involved partners.
The figure presents a diagram describing the information flow in the trading
system. Operational activities depicted on the right side of the diagram take place
at the trading desk or at the stock exchange, while the modeling tasks on the left
take place in the back office of the investment bank or at the consulting company.
A distinctive property of the theoretical model used for this project is its capacity
to produce interpretable causal explanations, saying how and why a given strategy
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Figure
Trade System Production Diagram
Theoretical — Verstehen — Actual
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Meanwhile, continuous fine tuning of the model parameters by statistical learning
is used to achieve efficient performance, as depicted at the bottom of the diagram.
Under favorable conditions, the system will converge to stable patterns of con-
duct or invariant forms of interaction, revealing reliable behaviors. In the jargon of
systems theory, such stable patterns or invariant forms are known as eigenbehaviors
or eigensolutions, and their associated quantities of interest are known as eigen-
functions, eigenvectors, eigenvalues, etc. Eigensolutions are characterized by the
four essential properties of precision, stability, separability, and composability. For
further comments on these four essential properties and their mathematical charac-
terization, see von Foerster (2003, pp. 305–323), Segal (2001), Borges and Stern
(2007), and Stern (2007a,b, 2011, 2014, 2017a).
The figure describes activities at a local level, that is, activities concerning a
single agent in the market. At a global level, regulating authorities must establish
and enforce fair-trade legislation leading to the so-called nonarbitrage conditions,
which in turn allow multiple investment agents to engage in sustainable forms of
interaction. Such sustainable trading markets are characterized by global (non-
stationary, statistical) equilibria that, in turn, are reflected by equilibrium prices
(eigenvalues) (see Cerezetti and Stern, 2012, Černý, 2009, Dothan, 1990, Ingrao
and Israel, 1990).
Before ending this section, some last comments: This consulting project made
me face for the first time the role of statistics as principled argument (see Abelson,
1995), as opposed to its standard and straightforward descriptive/predictive role.
Moreover, the two roles proved to be complementary and synergic. For example,
the final decision system based on the REAL decision-tree algorithm plus final
scrutiny based on expert opinion (expert supervision) could better detect market
anomalies and better screen high-risk situations, having overall better performance
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3 Norms, Laws, Eigenbehaviors, and Social System
In the example discussed in the last section, human decision processes were me-
diated by an algorithmic decision support system. This situation was helpful in
examining and making clear several important characteristics of behavioral pat-
terns emerging in this process and how these behavioral patterns actually come to
be. Nevertheless, I believe some of our general conclusions can be extrapolated to
a much wider range. The emerging field of law and economics has plenty of tempt-
ing examples suggesting possible ways to transport economic eigensolutions (or
equilibrium conditions) to the legal context. Nevertheless, in this section we follow
a different route, investigating the importance of these concepts for empirical legal
studies from a more fundamental perspective.
The goal of this section is to argue, strictly in the scope of the legal (autonomous/
autopoietic) system, for the need of both Verstehen and Erklären. As in the example
presented in the last section, our discussion will be tied to the emergence of eigen-
behaviors or eigensolutions, only this time in the legal context. Discussing these
points involves core epistemological and ontological questions. Hence, in order to
advance, we need to choose a theoretical framework of legal philosophy.
As theoretical framework we elect Niklas Luhmann’s (1927–1998) Sociological
Theory of Law, complemented by the more general frameworks of systems the-
ory and cognitive constructivism, for they have already been used by Luhmann in
the development of his sociological theories (see Luhmann, 1985, 1989, 1990a,b,
and also Brier, 2005; Segal, 2001; von Foerster, 2003, pp. 305–323; Maturana and
Varela, 1980; Rottleuthner, 1988; Rusch, 2007; Ost, 1988; and Varela, 1979). All
these frameworks have been greatly developed in the current century, with the po-
tential of further expanding the scope and increasing the power of Luhmann’s orig-
inal work.
In Luhmann’s view, a norm does not concern cognition of factual reality; rather,
it concerns an idealized model of how reality should be. Hence, a norm is initially
only a projection, or a subjective model; see Luhmann (1985, p. 40). In Luhmann’s
theory of law, the function of the legal system is congruent generalization of nor-
mative behavior expectations (see Luhmann, 1985, pp. 77, 82). Legal codes and
specific laws establish well-defined rules of behavior in a society, at the same time
reflecting and inducing the adoption of well-defined behavioral patterns. More-
over, in this perspective, both norms and laws are essentially dynamic, coevolving
with the behavioral patterns in the society that they simultaneously try to describe
and regulate. Finally, the legal system has the role of providing remediation for
frustrated expectations when the law is broken, either in the form of repair or com-
pensation for victims, or in the form of punishment for offenders.
Ignorantia juris non excusat or ignorantia legis neminem excusat states the
inexcusability-of-ignorance principle, according to which ignorance or lack of un-
derstanding is not a valid excuse for breaking the law. This principle is a logical
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rective measures be coherently applied. Nevertheless, wise legislators should not
ignore the ways in which laws are known, perceived, and understood.
In Luhmann’s theoretical framework, the legal system can only achieve its goal
of congruent generalization of normative expectations – as they are coded in spe-
cific laws – if individuals (and other participating agents) comply; and compliance
involves knowledge, understanding, and acceptance of the same laws. Moreover,
social harmony depends on the establishment of reliable, stable, and sustainable
forms of interaction. Hence, legislators should take into account the legal system’s
capacity to induce the emergence of eigenbehaviors. Consequently, when altering
or disrupting a legal system, legislators should pay close attention to how such al-
terations are known, perceived, and understood by the participating agents of the
affected society. Finally, preliminary and follow-up studies should track the pro-
cess of convergence to (or divergence from) pertinent eigenbehaviors, also taking
into account relevant second-order or higher-order effects.
4 Wishful Thinking or Ripe for the Picking?
As reviewed in the last sections, the idea of understanding social processes in terms
of meanings attributed or concepts used (either explicitly or implicitly) by individ-
ual actors participating in the same processes has a long and respected tradition –
see Feest (2010) for historical perspectives; see Engel et al. (2009), Engel (2013a,b,
2015), Levy and Mislevy (2016), and Pearl (2000) for recent overviews of useful
statistical techniques; see Inhasz and Stern (2010) and Takada and Stern (2015)
for some of our own work in developing interpretable models; see Blanc, Macrae,
and Ottimofiore (2015) and Voermans (2011, 2014) for recent examples of work
addressing individual agent understandings, causal explanations, individual or col-
lective motivation, opinion change phenomena, and related matters in the field of
legal studies.
Still (aside from the collateral or indirect route of law and economics), there has
been relatively little work in statistical modeling of individual agents and collective
behavior specifically linked to their causal motivations or the involved conceptual
understandings in the field of empirical legal studies. Hence the question: Is the
proliferation of research programs in accordance with the last paragraph of sec-
tion 3 just wishful thinking? Or are there opportunities ripe for the picking?
I see good reasons for optimism, many opportunities to explore, and also some
difficulties to overcome. I will focus on a few specific opportunities inspired by
(once again) previous work of Professor McCubbins. However, before proceeding
in this direction, I need to address an important issue raised by Niklas Luhmann,
namely: who are the primary agents of interest in the social theory of law?
In the scope of legal studies, Luhmann redirects the spotlight of our attention
away from individual human beings and towards systemic elements – including
the whole legal system at the top level, and a great variety of institutions, organi-
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specifies (systemic) communication operations as the form of social interaction
most suitable for theoretical (and hence also empirical) analysis (see Luhmann,
1985, 1989, 1990a,b; and Teubner, 1988). The last point is made clear in the fol-
lowing quotation:
“The idea of system elements must be changed from substances (individuals) to self-
referential operations that can be produced only within the system and with the help
of a network of the same operations (autopoiesis). For social systems in general and
the system of society in particular the operation of (self-referential) communication
seems to be the most appropriate candidate.” (Luhmann, 1989, p. 7)
I believe this framework to be amenable to many alternative and still little-
explored ways of inquiry that may be helpful in overcoming traditional difficulties
and bottlenecks. For example: On one hand, McCubbins, Turner, and Weller (2012,
2013) make clear how challenging it can be to access the “internal” states of indi-
vidual human beings, either in the form of manifested motivations or in the form of
elicited preferences, constraints, utility functions, etc. On the other hand, McCub-
bins, Paturi, and Weller (2009) and Enemark, McCubbins, and Weller (2014) have
developed computational tools for the analysis of decision processes in communi-
cation networks, which could be immediately applied in the abstract context sug-
gested by Luhmann’s framework.
Furthermore, as the media of systemic communication in modern societies
change from paper to digital, both structure and contents of systemic communi-
cation become readily available for empirical studies. Content (legal documents)
can be processed using a variety of tools developed for automated text analysis, in-
formation extraction, and ontology construction (see, for example, Ferneda et al.,
2012, Mika, 2005, and Sartor et al., 2011). This kind of information may allow
empirical analyses of motivations and understandings of participating agents (as
recognized by the system in which they interact, that is, as expressed and commu-
nicated in terms of the system’s ontology), avoiding however the need of making
cumbersome hypotheses concerning inaccessible internal states of individual hu-
man beings and overcoming consequent methodological difficulties.
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